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1. Introduction:  
1.1 Objectives and procedure 
Which nominal anchor can EU accession countries choose on their way to EMU? In 
principle several options exist, though inflation targeting seems to be the most popular one at 
present, e.g. using the exchange rate or a monetary aggregate as an intermediate target, or 
even using an implicit nominal anchor. Most economists view an implicit nominal anchor as 
highly discretionary and thereby less credible. Additionally, many EU accession countries 
regard monetary and exchange rate targeting also as inferior to inflation targeting: They view 
monetary targeting as unsuitable in an environment of ongoing emergence of financial 
innovations and gradual opening of capital accounts. However, an explicit exchange rate 
target may be too vulnerable to speculative attacks especially after their entry into ERM 2.  
Nonetheless, why are exchange rate movements important for EU accession 
countries? Most of them belong to the class of small open economies and thus are highly 
susceptible to exchange rate movements. Furthermore, some of these countries have tried to 
strike a delicate balance between lowering inflation and preserving competitiveness. 
Accordingly, a real appreciation is sometimes less perceived as a fundamental development 
than as a “bubble”, which central banks try to reverse by interest rate changes or by 
interventions combined with costly sterilization. Moreover, entering the ERM 2 with an 
“overvalued” exchange rate would challenge a quick entry to EMU, as during the minimum 
of two years, nominal revaluation but certainly not devaluation may be allowed.  
And why will exchange rate movements still be important even if the countries have 
subsequently chosen other strategies? Even pure inflation targeting usually includes the 
exchange rate as one of several inflation indicators, though the credibility of the strategy 
requires that monetary policy should not aim at targeted levels of the exchange rate. The 
exchange rate objective has to be clearly subordinated to the inflation target. Nevertheless, 
due to the significant pass-through-effect in small open economies monetary policy may pay 
special attention to exchange rate movements because the exchange rate has an important 
impact on inflation. Disruptive exchange rate volatility arising from a thin foreign exchange 
market or temporary shocks could be further reasons to smooth exchange rate movements, 
even if countries maintain official floating exchange rate regimes with inflation targeting 
frameworks (Carare et al., 2002, p. 3-5). However, at times it might be hard to distinguish, 
whether the inflation target or the exchange rate target is the predominant objective of the 
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central bank. In other words: countries may officially declare that they pursue a managed 
floating exchange rate regime with price stability as the ultimate goal, but implicitly, they 
may also pursue an unannounced exchange rate target for other reasons, e.g. in order to 
preserve external competitiveness. In this case, the authorities’ self description of exchange 
rate regimes differs from the de facto regimes.1   
The paper addresses these questions by looking at the recent experience of selected 
EU accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe. First, we summarize nominal anchors, 
these countries have officially chosen and evaluate the success of their implementation. Then 
we assess the degree of implicit exchange rate targeting by comparing Central and Eastern 
European countries over time and between each other. We therefore use static and dynamic 
volatility measures, frequency distributions and regression analysis for sub-periods during 
which different official regimes prevailed.  
The study concentrates on the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia, six EU accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe and on the 
time period since 1994. Whereas the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak 
Republic have shifted from more fixed to more flexible exchange rate regimes, Slovenia and 
Romania have announced managed floating exchange rate regimes during the entire sample 
period. Accordingly, the study excludes EU accession countries which have opted for very 
hard pegs as the currency board regimes in Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania, and the pegged 
regime in Latvia.  
 
1.2 Current state of the art in the research field 
If we assume that countries have continued to pursue exchange rate targets even 
though they officially claim to target other nominal anchors, the most relevant literature to 
this topic is the literature on de facto exchange rate regimes. Generally, two approaches may 
be taken to disentangle de facto exchange rate regimes from the officially announced 
arrangements. The first one looks at the instruments, with which the central bank tries to 
manage exchange rate movements, i.e. official reserves and interest rates. Popper and Lowell 
(1994) use this approach and study changes in foreign reserve holdings and the behavior of 
prices in response to exchange rate changes for four Pacific Basin countries. The second 
                                                 
1 This well known feature has also been acknowledged by the IMF, see Fischer (2001). For a discussion on 
exchange rate arrangements, chosen in transition countries, see Mussa et al. (2000).  
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approach looks at the results of the exchange rate policies, i.e. at the variations of exchange 
rates. Studies, which follow this approach, are Haldane and Hall (1991), who analyze the 
Sterling’s transition from a dollar peg to a DM peg. Frankel and Wei (1992, 1993) evidence 
an increasing influence of the yen in the nominal exchange rate policies of some Asian 
countries since the early 1980s. Furthermore, Bénassy-Quéré (1996) concludes that Western 
Europe constituted a strong monetary bloc pegging to the DM during 1989-1995 that was not 
pulled down by the ERM crises. She also concludes, that Eastern European countries did not 
adopt a DM nominal peg during this early period, although included the DM in their de facto 
basket peg. In contrast, Asian countries rarely weighed the yen in their implicit basket pegs 
and their peg to the US Dollar was loser than for European currencies vis-à-vis the DM.  
More recent studies use both approaches in order to study de facto exchange rate 
regimes. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) compare volatilities of the exchange rate, interest rate and 
international reserves across 154 exchange rate arrangements and use a vector autoregression 
analysis to study these variables. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) construct a de facto 
classification of exchange rate regimes, using cluster analysis techniques for data from all 
IMF-reporting countries over the period 1974-99. In this approach different regimes are 
grouped according to the behavior of the exchange rates and international reserves. Neither 
study supports the hypothesis that intermediate regimes have been de facto disappearing in 
recent years, but indicates that countries that claim to pursue a floating exchange rate regime 
mostly do not. 
Frankel et al. (2001) test the verifiability of official exchange rate regimes, a related 
topic. They use regression analysis to investigate whether and how the exchange rate is given 
by a weighted combination of foreign currencies taking into account possible rates of crawl. 
Their findings support that more complicated regimes with basket pegs, wider or frequently 
changing bands are harder to verify and that this may be a reason for the popularity of corner 
solutions. For a small sample of countries with officially declared floating exchange rate 
regimes (Brazil, Mexico, Peru, South Korea and Thailand) their tests do not yield any 
evidence against the hypothesis that the exchange rates of these countries are indeed floating, 
with the exception of Peru and part of the post-Tequila period in Mexico.  
A paper explicitly dealing with de facto and official exchange rate regimes in 
transition countries is that by von Hagen and Zhou (2002). In a sample of 25 transition 
countries they use probit models to describe the joint determination of the two regime choices 
and the determination of regime discrepancies. They find that official regimes are more 
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persistent and change in less frequent but larger steps than de facto regimes do. Also apart 
from other factors they find that countries with more developed monetary systems are more 
likely to adopt an official floating-rate regime, thus supporting the fact that some Central and 
Eastern countries moved to more flexible arrangements on their way to EU accession. 
 
2. Official Nominal Anchors – a Look at Recent Experiences 
Usually emerging markets use some form of fixed exchange rates in the early stages of 
disinflation until they progress to other strategies. This can be witnessed in four out of the six 
countries which we investigate in our sample. The Czech and the Slovak Republic, Hungary 
and Poland have moved from rather fixed to more flexible exchange rate arrangements. 
Hungary and Poland have chosen crawling peg or band regimes in the early stage and the 
Czech and the Slovak Republic exchange rate regimes with horizontal pegs, whereas Slovenia 
and Romania has had managed floating regimes over the entire sample period.2 In table A1 in 
the appendix the official exchange rate regimes of the six countries since 1994 are 
summarized in more detail. Each country can be separated in different regimes depending not 
only on the choice between fixed or flexible exchange rates but also on the width of the band. 
This section gives a short overview about the strategies, which have been chosen by these 
countries while officially moving away from exchange rate targeting and how successful they 
have been.  
Czech Republic 
After the Czech Republic moved to a managed floating exchange rate regime in 1997, 
it introduced inflation targeting in 1998. The Czech National Bank (CNB) officially explained 
this step by the exchange rate crisis in spring 1997, during which the nominal anchor provided 
by exchange rate targeting had to be abandoned. Additionally the CNB viewed the demand 
for money as too unstable in an environment of major financial innovations and a liberalized 
capital account for introducing a monetary aggregate as an intermediary target (Annual report 
of the CNB 1998, p. 48). So far there have been two sub-periods of inflation targeting: During 
1998-2001 the CNB pursued net inflation3 targeting with an end-year target range. By using a 
core CPI the central bank excludes components that are beyond its control, though this 
                                                 
2 The IMF defines a managed float as a flexible exchange rate regime "with no predetermined path for the 
exchange rate" (Ishii and Habermeier 2002, p. 344).  
3 Headline inflation minus regulated prices and changes in indirect taxes 
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measure of inflation is less familiar to the public and therefore may be less credible. Since 
20024 the CNB has shifted to headline inflation targeting with a continuous linear and 
declining target band. Escape clauses are incorporated into the new strategy and allow a 
deviation from the announced target. Among the possible influences are also deviations of the 
koruna’s exchange rate that are not connected with domestic economic fundamentals and 
domestic monetary policy. So in principle, this shelters the CNB from having an implicit 
exchange rate target while officially pursuing inflation targeting: it is not forced to engage in 
exchange rate smoothing should exchange rate shocks jeopardize meeting the announced 
target.  
 
TABLE 1. Inflation targeting in the Czech Republic  
Net inflation targeting 
Target date set in Target level* Actual inflation 
Dec. 1998 Dec. 1997 5.5-6.5% below (3.8%) 
Dec. 1999 Nov. 1998 4-5% below (1.5%) 
Dec. 2000 Dec. 1997 3.5-5.5% below (3.0%) 
Dec. 2001 April 2000 2-4% within (2.4%) 
Dec. 2005 April 1999 1-3%  
Headline inflation targeting 
Target period set in Target level* Actual inflation 
Jan. 2002 - Dec. 2005 April 2001 3-5% to 2-4%  
* end-year target range ** linear declining band 
Source: Annual Report of the CNB 
 
As shown in Table 1 the success of inflation targeting was rather mixed. Since the 
introduction of inflation targeting in 1998 the CNB undershot the target three out of four 
times. The official explanations were focused on exceptional developments, which were 
beyond the reach of the central bank’s monetary policy. Undershooting the target is not 
                                                 
4 announced in April 2001 
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unusual to countries that are disinflating. They rather accept below-target inflation outcomes 
and take advantage of unexpected disinflationary outcomes to announce lower targets (Carare 
et al., 2002, 13-14). Nevertheless, it may have a negative impact on credibility as the 
impression can arise that there are too many factors beyond the control of the central bank 
even though it already uses a core CPI.  
Hungary 
Until recently Hungary managed the nominal exchange rate in a fairly narrow 
crawling band. In 2001 the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) widened the band substantially, 
then introduced a horizontal band and adopted inflation targeting. The inflation target is 
surrounded by a +/-1 percent tolerance band and was achieved in 2001. The medium term 
strategy is to prevent inflation exceeding 3.5 percent by December 2003.5 
Poland 
Until 1998, the National Bank of Poland (NBP) attempted to conduct a monetary 
policy by combining the elements of monetary and exchange rate targeting: The intermediate 
target was to increase the money supply under conditions of crawling devaluation of the Zloty 
vis-à-vis the basket of currencies. This strategy did not allow meeting the two intermediate 
targets in full, although initially, it allowed for reducing inflation.6 The NBP widened the 
band substantially and introduced direct inflation targeting in 1998 by arguing with the 
advancing integration of the Polish financial markets with the global markets. The inflation 
target is defined with regard to the consumer price inflation at the end of the year. The 
medium term strategy aims at reducing inflation below 4% by the end of 2003. However, 
each year short term inflation targets are announced. 
The NBP so far has never hit its short term target as is shown in Table 2: it equally 
undershot and overshot its target during the last four years. As in case of other inflation 
targeters, the NBP has usually explained the failure to achieve the target by citing external 
factors, which it has been unable to influence.  
 
                                                 
5 Web page of the NBH, Annual Report 2001 
6 NBP, Medium-Term Monetary Policy Strategy, 1999-2003 
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TABLE 2. Inflation targeting of the NBP 
Year Inflation target Actual inflation 
1998 < 9.5% Below (8.6%) 
1999 6.6-7.8% Above (9.8%) 
2000 5.4-6.8% Above (8.5%) 
2001 6-8% Below (3.6) 
Source: Annual Report of the NBP 
 
Romania 
Romania has had a managed floating exchange rate regime during the entire sample 
period. However, the exchange market has only been liberalized since 1997. The National 
Bank of Romania (NBR) has no explicit commitment to a specific exchange rate or inflation 
path. It perceives base money management as the most viable method to contain inflation,7 
though this target has often been overruled by quasi-fiscal objectives. Although in 1997, 
directed credit by the central bank were terminated, quasi-fiscal interests have still 
jeopardized price stability, e.g. liquidity injections have at times supported ailing state banks.8  
Slovakia 
After the Slovak Republic moved to a managed floating exchange rate regime in October 
1998, it has used inflation bands as an informal guide for monetary policy since 1999. 
However, it does not call its strategy a formal inflation targeting.9 In the Revised Monetary 
Program of the National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) the inflation band is defined as year-end 
consumer price inflation. If the inflation rate approaches the limits of the band, the NBS will 
take action to reassess its policies. As shown in Table 3 the NBS undershot two out of three 
times its informal inflation target.  
                                                 
7 NBR, various annual reports 
8 IMF, Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, 6.11.02, http//www.imf.org 
9 The NBS does not make an inflation forecast, nor does it issue inflation reports, but it does explain deviation 
from the target band in its annual report. 
 7
TABLE 3. Informal Inflation targeting of the NBS 
Year Inflation band Actual inflation 
1999 13.5-15.5% within (14.2%) 
2000 8.8-9.9%  below (8.5%) 
2001 6.7-8.2% below (6.5%) 
Source: Annual reports of the NBS 
Slovenia 
Slovenia has had a managed floating exchange rate regime over the entire sample 
period. Until 2000 it used a monetary aggregate as a nominal anchor, which the authorities 
have officially explained by greater discipline, transparency, and credibility than an inflation 
targeting framework. This benefit would offset the concerns about the stability of money 
demand in a changing financial environment. Several sub-periods of monetary targeting can 
be distinguished: During 1994-95 the Bank of Slovenia (BoS) targeted base money, in 1996 
also M1 and since 1997 it explicitly declared M3 as its intermediate target and announced a 
target band. Slovenian M3 includes foreign exchange deposits of private households, which 
comprise about 30% of M3.10 Thus, exchange rate movements also influence M3 growth (e.g. 
a depreciation of the tolar raises the value of foreign exchange deposits and vice versa). 
 
TABLE 4: M3 growth-targeting of the BoS 
Target date set in Target level* Actual M3 growth 
1997 May 1997 14-22% within (20.9%) 
1998 March 1998 18-26% within (20.1%) 
1999 Jan 1999 16-24% within (16.0%) 
2000 Jan 2000 12-18% within (16.3%) 
2001 Jan 2001 11-17% above (23.9%) 
* defined as the fourth quarter average over the corresponding period of the previous year 
Source: Annual Report of the BoS 
                                                 
10 Average of end year data for 1999-2001 
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In Table 4 the actual and targeted M3 growth is shown since 1997. The BoS mostly hit 
its intermediate target, though the formulation of quite wide target ranges (6 to 8%-points) 
facilitated this outcome, but also made the strategy less credible. 
In 2001 the BoS switched to a new monetary policy framework, which is more similar 
to inflation targeting, as it bears some of its hallmarks, e.g. the announcement of a medium-
term inflation objective (4% by the end of 2003) or the publication of updated inflation 
forecasts. Similar to the strategy of the ECB the BoS bases its monetary policy indicators on 
two pillars: indicators of liquidity, and other economic indicators, as for example the 
exchange rate, foreign interest rates, wages and growth in administered prices.11  
Summing up so far, there has been a general shift to more flexible exchange rates and 
the more advanced EU accession countries have subsequently looked for other nominal 
anchors than the exchange rate. However, there is no clear evidence how determined or how 
capable they were in achieving other nominal anchors: Some of them have often missed to hit 
their official targets, others have chosen quite wide bands. So, even if these countries have 
officially moved to more flexible arrangements, they may have still paid attention to exchange 
rate movements. To which extent they may have done so is the objective of the following 
section.   
 
3. Implicit Exchange Rate Targeting – Some Evidence 
                                                
3.1 Volatility and Frequency Distribution 
We first investigate the volatility of exchange rates, foreign exchange reserves and 
interest rates in order to find some evidence for implicit exchange rate targeting. The 
underlying idea is that even in countries which announce to have floating exchange rates 
shocks to the exchange rate are accommodated through purchases and sales of foreign 
exchange reserves or through interest rate movements. Accordingly, the volatility of foreign 
exchange rates is fairly low, whereas the volatility of foreign exchange reserves and interest 
rates is relatively high.12 
 
11 BoS Annual Report, p. 23 
12 However, this approach is not suitable for detecting very credible fixed exchange rate regimes, as in this case, 
a low volatility of the exchange rate would be coupled with a low volatility of reserves and interest rates.  
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We compare two sets of observations during the time period January 1994 to April 
2002 in Table 5a and 5b. The first set, called FIX, includes the countries, which have 
officially announced to have had fairly fixed exchange rate regimes during the country 
specific time period.13 The second set, called FLOAT, shows the volatility of exchange rates, 
reserves and interest rates for the specific time periods, in which countries have officially 
declared to have floating exchange rate regimes.14  
 
TABLE 5a. Volatility of exchange rates, reserves and 
interest rates, FIX  
 Czech Rep. Poland Hungary Slovak Rep. 
Exchange rate1 1.0 2.1 0.7 0.6 
Reserves (normalized)2 5.0 5.7 10.2 10.4 
Interest rate3 1.4 2.3 0.9 1.7 
 
TABLE 5b. Volatility of exchange rates, reserves and 
interest rates, FLOAT  
 Czech 
Rep. 
Poland Hungary Slovak 
Rep. 
Slovenia Romania 
Exchange rate1 1.6 2.7 1.8 1.8 0.6 5.9 
Reserves (normalized)2 3.4 6.1 7.9 9.3 18.8 8.9 
Interest rate3 1.5 1.3 0.3 1.1 3.2 11.7 
Source: monthly data, IFS (see Appendix for details) 
Exchange rate volatility measured to basket or DEM (EUR) adjusted for announced devaluation in case of 
crawling peg regimes 
* Countries with official managed or free floating exchange rate regimes 
1 Standard deviation of monthly percentage changes of nominal exchange rates 
2 Standard deviation of monthly changes of foreign exchange reserves deflated by the monetary base 
3 Standard deviation of monthly changes in interest rates (percentage points) 
 
Exchange rates are measured against their respective anchor. In case of floating 
exchange rate regimes, the D-Mark or Euro is chosen as the implicit anchor and in case of 
crawling peg regimes the changes have been adjusted for the pre-announced depreciation rate 
in order to avoid announced shifts in the crawling pegs to be calculated as volatility.15 
Changes of foreign exchange reserves are normalized, i.e. they are deflated by base money. 
                                                 
13 Czech Republic: Jan. 1994 – May 1997, Hungary: Jan. 1994 – Apr. 2001, Poland: Jan. 1994 – Mar. 2000, 
Slovak Republic: Jan. 1994 – Sep. 1998  
14 Czech Republic: June 1997 – Apr. 2002, Hungary: May 2001 – Apr. 2002, Poland: Apr. 2000 – Apr. 2002, 
Slovak Republic: Oct. 1998 – Apr. 2002, Slovenia: Jan. 1994 – Apr. 2002, Romania: Jan. 1994 – Apr. 2002 
15 For a similar analysis for exchange rate volatility including some Ex-Yugoslav countries see Schobert (2001) 
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We use this ratio to approximate the monetary impact of the change in reserves.16 Some care 
must be taken when using changes in reserves as an indicator for intervention. Reserves may 
change owing to fluctuations in valuation and the accrual of interest earnings, or some growth 
may simply be desired to keep pace with the size of the market.  Interest rate changes are 
another instrument to smooth exchange rate fluctuations and it assumes that especially in 
emerging market countries they may not predominantly be set with domestic, but with 
external policy objectives in mind. 
Comparing the observations Slovenia is a case apart as it exhibits the highest volatility 
of reserves and a fairly high volatility of interest rates, but the lowest exchange rate volatility. 
This occurred despite the fact that it declared that it has had a managed floating exchange rate 
during the entire sample period. Accordingly, the indicators point at Slovenia as a likely 
candidate for implicit exchange rate targeting. The observations for Poland do not differ much 
between the two regimes probably due to the fact, that the exchange rate bands have been 
widened substantially before Poland officially declared a floating exchange rate regime. The 
most volatile exchange rate is observed for Romania though coupled with fairly volatile 
reserves and interest rates.  
We now investigate frequency distributions of key indicators for exchange rate 
regimes. Looking at Tables 6a and 6b the probability of staying within a predetermined band 
is given for the exchange rate, for reserves, for base money and for the interest rates. The 
method (including the choice of the band width) is based on Calvo and Reinhart (2000). Their 
results for different official regimes are shown for comparison in Table 6a. The underlying 
idea is, that in (implicit or explicit) fixed exchange rate regimes the probability for the 
exchange rate staying within a predetermined band should be high, whereas the probability 
for reserves, base money and interest rates should be low. 
The probabilities for exchange rates, reserves and base money in officially fixed 
exchange rate regimes (Table 6a) match this idea, however, the probability for interest rates 
are inconclusive.17 The results for officially floating exchange rate regimes (Table 6b) again 
indicate implicit exchange rate targeting for Slovenia. The probability of the exchange rate 
staying within a predetermined band has been highest, whereas the respective probabilities for 
                                                 
16 This normalization is quite common in the literature, e.g. in Popper and Lowell (1994) or in Sturzenegger and 
Yeyati (2000), though some studies use other denominator, e.g. M3 in von Hagen and Zhou (2002).  
17 A low probability of the interest rate staying within a narrow band might be due to a combination of trying to 
stabilize the exchange rate through open market operations and lack of credibility, see also Calvo and Reinhart 
(2000)  
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reserves, base money and interest rates have been fairly low. For the other countries the 
evidence of implicit exchange rate targeting is less clear-cut. Poland actually seems to be 
closest to a “true float” with regards to the indicators for the exchange rate and for reserves 
taking the Calvo/ Reinhart results for the USA as the reference. 
 
TABLE 6a. Probability that x lies within the band in fixed 
exchange rate regimes 
FIX Calvo/ Reinhart**  
X* Czech Rep. Poland Hungary Slovak Rep. fix 
lim. 
flex 
man. 
float USA
1 
Exchange Rate 2          
1% band 80.5 64.0 84.1 86.0 83.1 64.6 60.1 26.8 
2.5% band 97.6 82.7 100.0 100.0 95.9 92.0 87.5 58.7 
For. Ex. Reserves          
1% band 19.5 29.3 14.8 17.5 15.4 20.8 17.8 28.6 
2.5% band 36.6 52.0 33.0 38.6 36.5 45.9 39.2 62.2 
Base Money          
1% band 17.1 14.7 28.4 14.0 17.6 17.9 19.9 42.1 
2% band 36.6 20.0 59.1 29.8 34.2 32.2 36.5 67.2 
Interest Rate          
25 bps 41.5 16.0 46.6 31.6 52.3 47.5 36.3 59.7 
50 bps 65.9 33.3 68.2 50.9 69.3 68.7 49.4 80.7 
 
TABLE 6b.  Probability that x lies within the band in floating exchange rate regimes 
FLOAT  
X* Czech Rep. Poland Hungary Slovak Rep. Slovenia Romania 
Exchange Rate2        
1% band 72.9 20.0 41.7 55.8 85.0 26.0 
2.5% band 98.3 64.0 83.3 90.7 100.0 55.0 
For. Ex. Reserves       
1% band 69.5 32.0 16.7 18.6 19.0 12.0 
2.5% band 86.4 68.0 33.3 46.5 38.0 30.0 
Base Money         
1% band 79.7 12.0 16.7 20.9 10.0 12.0 
2% band 89.8 20.0 16.7 25.6 21.0 21.0 
Interest Rate        
25 bps 96.6 24.0 58.3 34.9 23.0 6.0 
50 bps 100.0 48.0 83.3 51.2 41.0 14.0 
Source: monthly data, IFS (see Appendix for details) 
* x is defined as % changes (in case of interest rates: changes expressed in basis points, bps) 
** Calvo/ Reinhart follow the IMF classification: peg, limited flexibility, managed floating and freely-floating  
Their sample uses monthly data for 39 countries during Jan 1970 to April 1999 
1 Exchange rate changes are measured against the D-Mark (Euro) 
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2 Exchange rate to the respective basket or to the Euro (DEM) in case of floating regimes, adjusted for pre-
announced devaluation in case of crawling peg regimes 
 
In Figure 1 changes in normalized foreign exchange reserve holdings are shown as 
quarterly data during the sample period. In line with the argument that central banks have 
substantially reduced the use of official interventions over time, changes in normalized 
foreign exchange reserves have decreased in most countries, though this is less pronounced in 
Slovenia. 
The combination of changes in normalized foreign exchange reserve holdings plus 
exchange rate movements provides a measure of the exchange market pressure facing a 
particular currency.18 This indicator is shown in figure 2.  
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FIGURE 1. Changes in normalized foreign exchange holdings, 1.Q.1994 – 2.Q.2002  
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18 See Popper and Lowell (1994), a depreciation or appreciation is measured as the annualized rate of change in 
the exchange rate over its level at the end of the preceding quarter. 
FIGURE 2. Changes in normalized foreign exchange holdings as a ratio to exchange rate 
movements, 1.Q.1994 – 2.Q.2002  
 
It is an indicator of the degree to which the authorities have succeeded in exchange 
rate-targeting by interventions in the foreign exchange market.19 Spikes indicate that large 
interventions were not accompanied by comparable changes in the exchange rate, while 
values close to zero indicate minimal foreign reserve movements and /or large exchange rate 
changes. So keeping in mind that central banks attempted to smooth exchange rate 
movements, i.e. reacted to exchange rate shocks by using interventions, spikes indicate 
periods of successful intervention. The visual inspection allows the following interpretation: 
Whereas in countries like the Czech Republic, interventions have not only decreased, as 
evidenced in FIGURE 1, but probably have also become less effective, as evidenced in FIGURE 
2. This development cannot be observed in Slovenia, which seems to have continued 
successful interventions.  
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Summing up so far, we have found some evidence of fear of floating or implicit 
exchange rate targeting. Combining these findings with a look at figure A1 – A6 in the 
appendix allows some further thought experiments. Slovenia seems to have pursued an 
implicit crawling peg regime as its exchange rate followed a smoother upward path than the 
exchange rates of Poland and Hungary, countries, which officially had crawling peg/ band 
regimes. Thus, Slovenia again is the most likely candidate to have pursued implicit exchange 
rate targeting. And as a second finding, central banks occasionally have had difficulties in 
 14
                                                 
19 Assuming again, that changes in foreign exchange holdings reflect these interventions. 
keeping the exchange rate from appreciating. During their fixed exchange rate regimes, 
exchange rates quite often remained in the lower part of the band. This is most pronounced in 
Hungary, where the exchange rate at times moved along the lower boundary of the band. 
However, it can also be observed during several periods in Poland (though it is less striking 
maybe due to wider bands) and in the mid-nineties in the Czech Republic.20   
In order to analyze these first findings in more detail we proceed with GARCH-
volatility estimations and a regression analysis.  
 
3.2 Evidence from GARCH Volatility Estimations 
As the volatility of exchange rates may give some deeper insights in the exchange rate 
regime followed, we carefully work out this topic. We rely on the well known class of 
GARCH models (Bollerslev 1986, for a survey see Bollerslev et al. 1992). According to the 
GARCH model of order one, which is often used to describe the dynamics of exchange rate 
volatility, the exchange rate return rt fluctuates around a mean µ with time-varying variance: 
rt = µ + εt , εt ~ N(0, σt2) (1) 
where the conditional variance is determined by the following equation: 
∑
=
−− +σ⋅β+ε⋅α+ω=σ
N
1i
i
2
1t
2
1t
2
t d  (2) 
where ω, α, β are real numbers and the di are a set of dummy variables representing 
subsequent regimes of exchange rate policies, which may lead to a shift in exchange rate 
volatility.  
We now estimate eq. (1) for the whole period from January 1994 through October 
2002. The returns rt are formed as the difference of logs of the exchange rate. For the rates 
officially following a crawling peg or crawling basket (the Hungarian forint and the Polish 
zloty) the returns are corrected for the announced rate of crawl. Therefore we split up the 
return into the announced and known rate of crawl and the unknown deviation from the 
central parity, which is the unknown movement within the band. The dummies correspond 
with the changing exchange rate regimes as given in table A.1, where the current regime in 
                                                 
20 If these countries were faced with trend real appreciations, as for example mentioned in Masson (1999), they 
may have partly intervened to limit these trends.  
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October 2002 is not represented by a dummy. However, the Slovenian tolar and the Romanian 
leu have been officially announced as managed floating during the entire period. 
Nevertheless, the plot of the SIT/DEM rate reveals a structural break at the beginning of 
1998. The movements of the exchange rate are extremely smooth until 1998 and then become 
much more volatile. So we include an additional dummy variable for the SIT/DEM rate 
before 1998. The situation is similar for Romanian leu: our results in section 3.3 indicate a 
structural change in the exchange rate development in April 1997, probably due to the 
extensive liberalization of the foreign exchange market. We therefore include an additional 
dummy variable for this exchange rate, as well. 
The estimation results are given in Table 7a and Table 7b for the exchange rates 
against the Deutsche Mark and the US Dollar. For most exchange rates the sum of α and β is 
close to one, which means that volatility shocks are highly persistent, but not permanent. The 
SIT/DEM rate, however, exhibits a different volatility pattern: the sum of α and β exceeds 
one, that is volatility shocks are not only highly persistent but permanent. This difference to 
the other rates may be due to the stepwise liberalization of financial markets leading to a 
continuous increase in exchange rate volatility.  
The result, that including most of the dummies significantly improves the fit of the 
model, matchs the history of the exchange rate regimes. There are only few exceptions: The 
coefficients d1 and d3 for the PLZ/DEM do not significantly contribute to the model, which 
means that the exchange rate arrangements from 1/1994 through 5/1995 and from 2/1998 
through 12/1998 exhibit volatility patterns which are quite similar to the period of the free 
floating PLZ. The influence of the exchange rate regime on the exchange rate volatility is 
considered in more detail below. 
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TABLE 7a.  Coefficient for GARCH models against Deutsche Mark respective Euro 
 
       CZK/DEM HUF/DEM PLZ/DEM ROL/DEM SIT/DEM SKK/DEM
µ -0.0056 0.0168**** 0.0021 0.0021 0.1072*** 0.0039*** -0.0072 
ω 0.0039*** 0.0102*** 0.0024*** 0.0021*** 0.0271*** 0.0009*** 0.0025*** 
α 0.1142*** 0.1255*** 0.0380*** 0.0378*** 0.0807*** 0.2824*** 0.0938*** 
β 0.8807*** 0.8068*** 0.9498*** 0.9509*** 0.8773*** 0.7618*** 0.8896*** 
d1 -0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0001 -- 0.0075*** -0.0009*** -0.0005** 
d2 0.00013 -0.0055*** -0.0011** -0.0009*** -- -- 0.0054*** 
d3 -- -0.0099*** -0.0007 -- -- -- -- 
d4 -- 0.0683*** 0.0015** 0.0015** -- -- -- 
        
LogL1 -879.14 -418,76 -1063.98 -1064.68 -2607.58 3556.68 -472.86 
DW2 2.0863 2.0093 2.1226 2.1227 1.7654 2.70004 1.87674 
1 Value of the log likelihood function 
2 Durbin Watson test statistic 
3 A Wald test indicates that the dummy d2 does not significantly contribute to the fit, whereas a Likelihood ratio test indicates that it does. We 
therefore do not remove it from the equation. 
4 After introduction of an additional AR(1) term, which eliminates all autocorrelation in the residuals for the SKK, there still remains some 
autocorrelation for the SIT.  
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TABLE 7b.  Coefficient for GARCH models against US Dollar 
 
       CZK/USD HUF/USD PLZ/USD ROL/USD SIT/USD SKK/USD
µ -0.0013 0.0477*** 0.0482*** 0.0098*** 0.0010*** 0.0952*** 0.0253* 0.0087 
ω 0.0118*** 0.0133*** 0.0104*** 0.0173*** 0.0170*** 0.0147*** 0.0125*** 0.0216**** 
α 0.0388*** 0.1297*** 0.1306*** 0.0357*** 0.0358*** 0.5412*** 0.0457*** 0.0807*** 
β 0.9418*** 0.8557*** 0.8570*** 0.9506*** 0.9516*** 0.4899*** 0.9321*** 0.8846*** 
d1 -- -0.0021 -- 0.0043 -- 0.0962*** -0.0041 -0.0052** 
d2 -- -0.0034 -- -0.0075* -0.0079*** -- -- -0.0030 
d3 -- 0.0235*** 0.0248*** -0.0065 -- -- -- -- 
d4 -- 0.0234** 0.0250** 0.0050 -- -- -- -- 
      --   
LogL1 -2490.87 -1918.60 -1919.01 -3180.67 -3183.30 -1446.70 -2177.80 -2332.89 
DW2 2.2110 2.0389 2.0389 2.0845 2.0845 1.8435 2.0988 2.3009 
1 Value of the log likelihood function 
2 Durbin Watson test statistic 
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The results are quite similar for the volatility against the USD with the exception that less 
dummy coefficients are statistically significant. This may be a first hint that the de facto 
exchange rate regimes are determined to the Deutsche Mark rather than to the US Dollar, with 
exception of the Romanian leu. 
 
TABLE 8.  Average Conditional Volatility against DEM and USD within subperiods  
 
CZK HUF PLZ ROL SIT SKK 
DEM USD DEM USD DEM USD DEM USD DEM USD DEM USD 
1/94-2/96 1/94-12/96 1/94-5/95 1/94-3/97 1/94-12/98 1/94-12/96 
0.063 0.548 0.395 0.419 0.142 1.124 0.816 1.185 0.002 0.383 0.073 0.476 
3/96-5/97 1/97-12/99 5/95-2/98 4/97-10/02 1/99-10/02 1/97-12/96 
0.178 0.428 0.105 0.266 0.116 0.858 0.708 0.413 0.049 0.531 0.161 0.463 
5/97-10/02 1/00-5/01 2/98-12/98   10/98-10/02 
0.272 0.633 0.009 0.886 0.111 0.759     0.156 0.600 
 5/01-9/01 1/99-4/00    
  0.813 0.964 0.228 1.219       
 10/01-10/02 4/00-10/02    
  0.165 0.442 0.254 1.487       
 
By using the volatility estimations from Tables 7a and 7b we compute the average 
conditional variance for each regime. The results are shown in Table 8. There are two major 
findings in the results: First, the volatility against the USD is for most currencies much higher 
than against the DEM. This supports the view that most currencies have been more stable vis-à-
vis the Deutsche Mark than vis-à-vis the US dollar. This may not necessarily be due to exchange 
rate policy, but also hints at a higher integration to the European economy than to the US. The 
only exception is the Romanian leu between 4/1997 and 10/2002. Whereas the leu was more 
volatile against the US dollar during the first period, the picture was different for the second one: 
the high volatility against the Deutsche mark in comparison with the volatility against the US 
dollar gives a first hint at some kind of pegging to the US dollar for the case of Romania. 
Second, the managed floating regimes (this does not apply to the free floating regime in 
Poland) are not necessarily the most volatile ones for the respective exchange rate. For the Czech 
koruna and the Slovak koruna, for instance, the volatility does not increase after switching to a 
managed float, for the latter it rather declines. This fits well to the next section's result that both 
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countries were not able to achieve their goals during their last period of official pegging and were 
rather driven by market forces to switch to floating exchange rates.  
 
3.3 Are Announced Exchange Rate Regimes Verifiable? 
After the analysis of volatility has given some first insights to the de facto exchange rate 
regimes, we will now try to assess whether the official pegs and baskets have been credible and 
verifiable. 
In a first step we consider the deviation from the announced central parity. It emerges 
from the following equation: 
ttt CP.consts ε++=  (3) 
where st is the exchange rate of the currency under observation against a numeraire and 
CPt is the central parity of the exchange rate band. If the authority is successful in pegging the 
exchange rate, the error term εt must be stationary. Testing the error term εt for a unit root then 
turns out to be a test whether the announced fixed exchange rate regime is working or not. This 
approach can, of course, not be applied to currencies or periods for which no central parity was 
announced, these are the managed floats of the Czech koruna (since 5/1997) and the Slovak 
koruna (since 10/1998), the free float of the Polish zloty (since 4/2000), the Slovenian tolar and 
the Romanian leu. The results for the remaining periods are given in Table 9. Note that we do not 
need to use corrected critical values for the unit root tests as given by, for instance, Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993), because the cointegration equation has not to be tested but is given by the 
definition of the central parity in eq. (3). Conventional augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillips 
Perron unit root tests are used instead21.  
 
                                                 
21 In the classical Engle and Granger cointegration test the usual ADF and Phillips Perron test statistics cannot be 
applied to the residuals of the OLS estimation, because the OLS regression already gives an estimation of the 
cointegration equation which looks "most stationary" among all possible linear combinations. In our case, however 
the coefficient for CPt is set to one by definition, so standard critical values are appropriate. For a discussion of this 
topic see Dickey et al. (1991), p. 69. 
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TABLE 9. Unit root tests for the deviation from central parity1 
 
 CZK HUF PLZ5 SKK 
 1/1994-2/1996 1/1994-12/1996 5/1995-2/1998 1/1994-12/1996 
ADF2 -5.62*** -3.09*** -1.97** -1.87* 
PP3 -18.81*** -4.37*** -2.07** -2.76*** 
     
 3/1996-5/1997 1/1997-12/1999 2/1998-12/1998 1/1997-9/1998 
ADF -0.59 -2.17** -1.98** -0.52  
(-3.71***)4 
PP -0.86 -2.34** -2.24** -1.27  
(-5.53***)4 
     
  1/2000-5/2001 1/1999-4/2000  
ADF  -4.26*** -2.34**  
PP  -4.63*** -2.06**  
     
  5/2001-9/2001   
ADF  -2.30**   
PP  -2.89***   
     
  10/2001-10/2002   
ADF  -1.71*   
PP  -1.43   
1 No central parity available for the officially floating Slovenian tolar and the Romanian leu. 
2 ADF: Augmented Dickey Fuller test against null hypothesis of unit root. 
3 PP: Phillips Perron test against null hypothesis of unit root. 
4 ADF and PP test statistics when a shorter sample period is used. 
5 Data for 1/1994 through 12/1996 not available. 
 
The results show that there are mainly two groups of exchange rates: The first group 
consists of the Hungarian forint and the Polish zloty. Both exchange rates show stationary error 
terms, except for Hungary's present exchange rate regime, for which there is no clear evidence. 
Considering these results it can be stated that both countries have been quite successful in 
managing their exchange rates and have achieved their exchange rate goals. In contrast, for the 
Czech and the Slovak koruna the exchange rate regime was working only during the first period, 
whereas they were both not able to hold the exchange rate stable within the announced band after 
widening it. The case of the Slovak koruna is somehow special, because during the second 
subsample, when the band was ±7 per cent, the null of a unit root is soundly rejected when the 
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data for approximately the last 6 month are dropped. It therefore follows that the NBS was able to 
hold the exchange rate stable for about nine months after widening the band, but since early 1998 
the exchange rate got more and more unstable and forced the NBS to switch to a managed float. 
In contrast the Czech koruna immediately lost its stability against the central parity after the 
exchange rate target got weaker in 1996 and consequently the CNB switched to a managed float 
after a comparatively short time: The widened band was in use for only 14 months. 
As a second step we compare the officially announced weights of the basket currencies 
with the estimated ones. A quite general formulation (Frankel et al. 2001) of some alternative 
exchange rate regimes is given by the specification, which we refer to as the currency model: 
t
N
1i
t,iit swtd.consts ε+⋅+⋅+= ∑
=
t
N
1i
t,iit swds ε+∆⋅+=∆ ∑
=
                                                
 (4) 
where st is the currency under observation expressed in a numeraire, const. is a real 
number, d is the rate of crawl, t the time parameter and si,t are currencies to which st is pegged. 
The currencies si,t are expressed in the same numeraire as st and weighted in the basket with some 
weights wi, which are nonnegative real numbers and sum up to one. As the numeraire we use the 
special drawing right (SDR) as proposed by Frankel and Wei (1993), although other numeraires 
would also be convenient22. For a deeper discussion of this question see Frankel et al. (2001). 
It is obvious that eq. 1 nests a number of relevant alternative regimes. A simple peg 
implies d=0, N=1; a crawling peg d>0, N=1; a basket peg d=0, N>1 and a crawling basket d>0, 
N>1.  
As proposed by Frankel et al. (2001) we apply the model to differences of log exchange 
rates and the model evolves to: 
 (4') 
The setting of eq. (4) and eq. (4') allows performing various tests concerning the de facto 
exchange rate regime (H0 denotes the null hypothesis, HA the alternative): 
 
22 We reestimated equation (4') using the Japanese yen and the Swiss franc as a numeraire. This leads to some minor 
changes in the results. These are, however, not substantial and the general impression remains stable. The estimation 
output is available from the authors on request. 
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• First, one may generally test for a significant rate of crawl, that is  
H1,0: d = 0 against H1,A: d ≠ 0 (test 1). 
• Second, we test for any common movements between the currency under investigation and 
possible basket currencies: 
H2,0: wi = 0 for each single i ∈ {1,..,N}against H2,A: wi ≠ 0 for any i ∈ {1,..,N} (test 2). 
• Third and fourth, we test whether the estimated weights are significantly different from the 
announced ones and sum up to one: 
H3,0: wi = wiofficial for all i ∈ {1,..,N}against H3,A: wi ≠ wiofficial for any i ∈ {1,..,N} (test 3) 
and  
H4,0: = 1 against H∑ =N 1i iw ∑4,A: ≠ 1 (test 4) =N 1i iw
• Fifth, we test, whether the exchange rate is solely determined by the Deutsche mark, this test 
is then referred to as test 5, with H5,0: wDEM=1, and all other weights are zero. Test 5 is 
performed, because a peg to the Deutsche mark (Euro) seems to be the most likely alternative 
to officially announced exchange rate regimes.  
 
The first and the second test may be performed by using a simple t-test on the parameter 
estimates, the third and the fourth one are done by applying conventional Wald tests. The results 
for the tests 3-5 are given in a separate column in Tables 10a-10f. The third test is, of course, 
only performed if there have been any announcements. 
The first and the second test may be performed by using a simple t-test on the parameter 
estimates and their results are simply given by the significance of the estimated coefficients.. The 
results for the tests 3-5, which are done by applying conventional Wald tests, are given in a 
separate column in Tables 10a-10f. The third test is, of course, only performed, if there have been 
any announcements at all. However, if the currency is (officially) pegged to the Deutsche mark 
(Euro), test 3, 4 and 5 are identical and only one result is given. 
For the Czech koruna (Table 10a) the rate of crawl coefficient can not be distinguished 
from zero. This is in line with the fact that the CNB has never announced any rate of crawl. It is, 
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however, interesting that Wald tests indicate the weight wDEM to be not significantly different 
from one, whereas the influence of the US Dollar seems to be at least close to zero for the whole 
period from 1994-5/1997. This is not in line with the officially announced basket, in which both, 
the Deutsche mark and the US dollar, were included. These results are confirmed by the tests. 
The announced weights are rejected on the one per cent level of significance for any particular 
subperiod. In contrast, the hypothesis that movements of the Czech koruna are solely determined 
by the Deutsche mark cannot be rejected. It is even more interesting that there is still a significant 
amount of common movements between the Deutsche mark and the Czech koruna after switching 
to a managed float, but also a slightly increased importance of the US dollar.  
 
TABLE 10a. Estimation of the currency model for the CZK (in differences) 
 
 d SDR/DEM SDR/USD Wald tests1 DW R2 F 
1/1994-
2/1996 
-0.0001 
(0.194) 
1.0106*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0064 
(0.880) 
H3,0: χ2=651.432***
H4,0: χ2=0.003 
H5,0: χ2=0.366 
1.983 0.723 704.88***
        
3/1996-
5/1997 
0.0000 
(0.882) 
0.9857*** 
(0.000) 
0.1246 
(0.390) 
H3,0: χ2=36.558*** 
H4,0: χ2=0.196 
H5,0: χ2=2.027 
2.054 0.291 62.10*** 
        
5/1997-
10/2002 
0.0000 
(0.488) 
0.9067*** 
(0.000) 
0.0567 
(0.300) 
H3,0: χ2=0.209  
H5,0: χ2=16.516*** 
2.093 0.406 470.29***
1 Wald tests as described above. The χ2 version of the Wald tests is used. 
H3,0: null hypothesis that the de facto weights equal the announced ones (only if there are any announced 
weights). 
H4,0: null hypothesis that the weights sum up to one. 
H5,0: null hypothesis that the wDEM=1 and all other weights are zero. 
Asterisks refer to level of significance: ***: ten per cent, **: five per cent, ***: one per cent. 
 
The results for the Hungarian forint (Table 10b) are in line with the officially announced 
exchange rate policy: All the estimated coefficients cannot be significantly distinguished from 
those announced. This applies to the currencies included, their weights and the rate of crawl d, 
with exception of the period from 5/2001-9/2001 when the rate of crawl was indeed 
comparatively low, and the period from 10/2001 to 10/2002, where the relationship to the Euro 
gets much weaker.  
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TABLE 10b. Estimation of the currency model for the HUF (in differences) 
 
 d SDR/ECU SDR/USD Wald tests1 DW R2 F 
1/1994-
12/1996 
-0.0008*** 
(0.000) 
0.8164*** 
(0.000) 
0.3539***
(0.000) 
H3,0: χ2=1.633 
H4,0: χ2=1.264 
H5,0: χ2=85.788*** 
2.099 0.099 40.93*** 
        
  SDR/DEM      
1/1997-
12/1999 
-0.0004*** 
(0.000) 
0.6800*** 
(0.000) 
0.3114***
(0.000) 
H3,0: χ2=1.244 
H4,0: χ2=0.029 
H5,0: χ2=457.551***
2.113 0.478 345.65***
        
  SDR/EUR      
1/2000-
5/2001 
-0.0001*** 
(0.003) 
0.9878*** 
(0.000) 
-- H3-5,0: χ2=2.634 
 
2.137 0.981 17212*** 
        
5/2001-
9/2001 
0.0004 
(0.581) 
0.8275*** 
(0.000) 
-- H3-5,0: χ2=1.344 
 
1.681 0.226 30.93*** 
        
10/2001-
10/2002 
0.0003 
(0.1954) 
0.7768*** 
(0.000) 
-- H3-5,0: χ2=14.979***
 
1.865 0.400 181.44***
1 Wald tests as described above. The χ2 version of the Wald tests is used. 
H3,0: null hypothesis that the de facto weights equal the announced ones (only if there are any announced 
weights). 
H4,0: null hypothesis that the weights sum up to one. 
H5,0: null hypothesis that the wDEM=1 and all other weights are zero. 
Asterisks refer to level of significance: ***: ten per cent, **: five per cent, ***: one per cent. 
 
The Polish zloty (Table 10c) provides less clear results for the first years. This may be due 
to the more complicated structure of the basket. It includes highly correlated currencies like the 
Deutsche mark, the Swiss franc and especially the French franc. The poor results are in line with 
Frankel et al. (2001), who state that exchange rate regimes become more difficult to verify when 
the number of currencies in the basket is high and the problem of multicollinearity in the 
regression occurs. We therefore rely mainly on the results for the simpler basket from 1/1999 to 
4/2000, which confirm the announced regime. Remarkably, the results do hardly differ for the 
period of the freely floating zloty. It still looks like being pegged to a basket of 60-65 per cent US 
dollar and 35-40 per cent Deutsche mark. However, the picture for the ROL is not that clear, 
because the R2 is considerably low for the last period (0.06), which means that the variance of the 
error term is high, although the F statistic shows that the estimated relationship is still significant. 
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TABLE 10c. Estimation of the currency model for the PLZ (in differences) 
 
 d SDR/ 
USD 
SDR/ 
DEM 
SDR/ 
GBP 
SDR/ 
FRF 
SDR/ 
CHF 
   
1/1994-
5/1995 
-0.0009*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0221 
(0.788) 
1.056*** 
(0.000) 
0.1433** 
(0.017) 
-0.0161 
(0.888) 
-0.1031 
(0.194) 
DW  2.038 
R2  0.569 
F  88.85*** 
          
5/1995-
2/1998 
-0.0003** 
(0.018) 
0.368*** 
(0.000) 
0.195 
(0.114) 
0.0296 
(0.463) 
-0.052 
(0.599) 
0.1777*** 
(0.001) DW  2.240 
R2  0.069 
F  10.20*** 
          
2/1998-
12/1998 
-0.0002 
(0.662) 
0.4596*** 
(0.004) 
2.1263 
(0.701) 
-0.299** 
(0.027) 
-2.2837 
(0.681) 
0.578*** 
(0.001) DW  2.208 
R2  0.170 
F  8.49*** 
          
 d SDR/USD SDR/EUR  Wald tests1     
1/1999-
4/2000 
-0.0003 
(0.4933) 
0.7520*** 
(0.000) 
0.4921*** 
(0.000) 
-- H3,0: χ2=2.227 
H4,0: χ2=1.793 
H5,0: χ2=123,178*** 
 DW  1.996 
R2  0.132 
F  25.03*** 
          
4/2000-
10/2002 
0.0000 
(0.9227) 
0.6733*** 
(0.000) 
0.3823*** 
(0.000) 
-- H4,0: χ2=0.111 
H5,0: χ2=378,421*** 
 DW  1.773 
R2  0.060 
F  20.46*** 
1 Wald tests as described above. The χ2 version of the Wald tests is used. 
H3,0: null hypothesis that the de facto weights equal the announced ones (only if there are any announced 
weights). 
H4,0: null hypothesis that the weights sum up to one. 
H5,0: null hypothesis that the wDEM=1 and all other weights are zero. 
Asterisks refer to level of significance: ***: ten per cent, **: five per cent, ***: one per cent. 
 
Although no regime change has been officially announced for the Romanian leu the data 
provide evidence that there was a change in exchange rate policy. We therefore apply Quandt's 
likelihood ratio test (QLR) for the constancy of a regression relationship and find a structural 
break in April 199723. This leads to Table 10d, which indeed shows different estimation results 
                                                 
23 For this date the test statistic, which is defined as the maximum value of the F statistic in a recursively applied 
Chow breakpoint test, takes the value 43.61 being significant at any conventional level of significance, see Andrews 
(1993). 
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for both subperiods. Both periods have in common that there is a significant rate of crawl, which 
exceeds the rates for the other currencies in this investigation by a factor of about ten. For the 
first period, up to 3/1997, the ROL seems to follow a basket including both, the Deutsche mark 
and the US dollar. The picture becomes different when the second subperiod is considered. The 
Deutsche mark is no longer significant, whereas the influence of the US dollar has increased. The 
ROL behaves like being pegged to the US dollar. Due to the considerably low R2, especially for 
the first period, the results have to be interpreted with some care. If the  NBR has implicitly 
followed a peg to Deutsche mark and US dollar up to 1997 and to the US dollar from 1997 on, 
they may have used a wide band. This makes it difficult to distinguish the exchange rate 
behaviour from a float (Frankel et al., 2001). 
 
TABLE 10d. Estimation of the currency model for the ROL (in differences) 
 
 d SDR/DEM SDR/USD Wald tests1 DW R2 F 
1/1994-
3/1997 
-0.0023*** 
(0.000) 
0.8100*** 
(0.000) 
0.6040***
(0.000) 
H4,0: χ2=2.439 
H5,0: χ2=77.330*** 
1.747 0.040 16.75*** 
        
 d SDR/EUR SDR/USD Wald tests1 DW R2 F 
4/1997-
10/2002 
-0.0011*** 
(0.000) 
0.0259 
(0.5411) 
0.8085***
(0.000) 
H4,0: χ2=2.926* 
H5,0: χ2=1446.34***
1.833 0.129 102.34***
1 Wald tests as described above. The χ2 version of the Wald tests is used. 
H3,0: null hypothesis that the de facto weights equal the announced ones (only if there are any announced 
weights). 
H4,0: null hypothesis that the weights sum up to one. 
H5,0: null hypothesis that the wDEM=1 and all other weights are zero. 
Asterisks refer to level of significance: ***: ten per cent, **: five per cent, ***: one per cent. 
 
The results for the Slovenian tolar (Table 10e) are most interesting. Although the 
exchange rate policy has been classified as managed float all the time, the results strongly 
indicate some form of peg. First, the rate of crawl coefficient d is significant for both periods 
(1/1994-12/1998 and 1/1999-10/2002). Second, any movements of the tolar are almost solely 
explained by movements of the Deutsche mark (up to 1998) respective the Euro (1999-2002). 
The values of the R2 and F statistic are very high, so we conclude that the BoS de facto followed 
a crawling peg against the Deutsche mark. 
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TABLE 10e. Estimation of the currency model for the SIT (in differences) 
 
 d SDR/DEM SDR/USD Wald tests1 DW R2 F 
1/1994-
12/1998 
-0.0002*** 
(0.000) 
0.9937*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0061 
(0.1549) 
H4,0: χ2=2.399 
H5,0: χ2=2.423 
0.7542 0.989 53612*** 
        
 d SDR/EUR SDR/USD Wald tests1 DW R2 F 
1/1999-
10/2002 
-0.0002*** 
(0.001) 
0.9765*** 
(0.000) 
0.0033 
(0.906) 
H4,0: χ2=0.254 
H5,0: χ2=3.835 
2.8322 0.861 2999*** 
1 Wald tests as described above. The χ2 version of the Wald tests is used. 
H3,0: null hypothesis that the de facto weights equal the announced ones (only if there are any announced 
weights). 
H4,0: null hypothesis that the weights sum up to one. 
H5,0: null hypothesis that the wDEM=1 and all other weights are zero. 
Asterisks refer to level of significance: ***: ten per cent, **: five per cent, ***: one per cent. 
2 The results do not substantially differ when an AR(1) error term is introduced which eliminates the 
autocorrelation. 
 
TABLE 10f. Estimation of the currency model for the SKK (in differences) 
 
 d SDR/DEM SDR/USD Wald tests1 DW R2 F 
1/1994-
12/1996 
-0.0001 
(0.352) 
1.0035*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0070 
(0.875) 
H3,0: χ2=0.002 
H4,0: χ2=775.63*** 
H5,0: χ2=0.132 
1.964 0.641 666.38***
        
1/1997-
9/1998 -0.0000 (0.828) 
1.0104*** 
(0.000) 
0.0079 
(0.902) 
H3,0: χ2=0.041 
H4,0: χ2=229.87*** 
H5,0: χ2=0.050 
1.904 0.549 264.86***
        
 d SDR/EUR SDR/USD Wald tests1 DW R2 F 
10/1998-
10/2002 
-0.0000 
(0.767) 
0.9155*** 
(0.000) 
0.0392 
(0.439) 
H4,0: χ2=0.394 
H5,0: χ2=16.137*** 
1.43722 0.560 662.29***
1 Wald tests as described above. The χ2 version of the Wald tests is used. 
H3,0: null hypothesis that the de facto weights equal the announced ones (only if there are any announced 
weights). 
H4,0: null hypothesis that the weights sum up to one. 
H5,0: null hypothesis that the wDEM=1 and all other weights are zero. 
Asterisks refer to level of significance: ***: ten per cent, **: five per cent, ***: one per cent. 
2 The results do not substantially differ when an AR(1) error term is introduced which eliminates the 
autocorrelation. 
 
The Slovak koruna (results in Table 10f) again shows a behaviour which is very close to 
that of the Czech koruna. Officially pegged to a basket of Deutsche mark and US dollar its 
movements are mainly explained by the Deutsche mark. This is confirmed by tests: The 
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announced weights are rejected at the one per cent level, whereas the hypothesis that the weight 
of the Deutsche mark is one, whereas the US dollar is not included in the basket cannot be 
rejected at any level of significance. Even when the CNB had switched to a managed float, the 
koruna behaves in a way that is very similar to the Euro, although the hypothesis that it is solely 
determined by the Euro is rejected. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The six Central and Eastern European countries being have investigated during the period 
1994 to 2002, have officially chosen different ways of stabilizing prices and exchange rates on 
their way to EU accession. In the early stage fixed exchange rates to a basket of currencies have 
dominated. While the Czech and Slovak Republic chose horizontal bands, Hungary and Poland 
had crawling peg/ band regimes. However, Slovenia and Romania claimed to have had managed 
floating exchange rate regimes during the entire sample period. The other countries subsequently 
moved to more flexible arrangements and mostly introduced a form of inflation targeting as the 
new nominal anchor.  
Our research focuses on the question to which extent these countries have actually 
followed the nominal anchors which they have officially declared to have. Our first approach 
looks at the evidence of inflation and monetary targeting in these countries and gives a very 
mixed picture. Inflation targets quite often have not been achieved. Not hitting the target was 
usually explained by external factors which were beyond the reach of the central bank. The 
authorities also used this explanation when they targeted core inflation, which should diminish 
the influence of these factors. Monetary targeting in Slovenia was quite successful, though it 
should be kept in mind, that the BoS used very wide bands and thereby reduced the possibility of 
not meeting the target. Additionally, the financial system was still underdeveloped and the capital 
market opened comparatively late. These factors may have facilitated monetary targeting in the 
early stage.  
We then investigated whether these countries have had an implicit exchange rate target: 
they may have had an implicit target even after they moved to floating exchange rates, or they 
may have actually preferred one currency during the period in which they targeted a basket of 
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currencies. We started with static volatility measures and frequency distributions. The evidence 
points at some implicit exchange rate targeting, especially in Slovenia, despite the fact that it 
declared a managed floating regime over the entire sample period.  
As a next step we estimated a GARCH model, in which we include exchange rate regime 
as dummies. For exchange rates against the D-Mark, the dummies mostly have a significant 
influence on the estimation whereas they are less important for exchange rates against the US 
dollar. This may serve as evidence that the US Dollar was less important even in the early stage 
when it was one of the official basket currencies. However, in the Czech Republic this finding is 
less clear.  
Unit root tests have supported the presumption that the Czech and Slovak koruna were 
driven to officially floating regimes by market forces. Under different external circumstances the 
authorities may have held on to the peg for longer.  
Finally we used regression analysis in order to detect the currencies to which these 
Central and Eastern European currencies have most likely been de facto pegged. For this purpose 
we follow the methodology of Frankel et. al. (2000). The results show that the forint and the zloty 
have matched their officially announced regime and that the tolar seems to follow a crawling peg 
to the D-Mark (Euro). The exchange rates of the Czech and Slovak koruna can be best explained 
by movements of the D-Mark during the period, when they had fixed exchange rates to a basket 
of the D-Mark and the US dollar, and there seems to be some evidence that they still implicitly 
pegged to the D-Mark (Euro) after they were officially floating. The Romanian leu instead has 
rather moved to an implicit Dollar peg over time.  
Summing up, the existence of an implicit exchange rate regime seems to be most likely in 
case of Slovenia, whereas in Hungary and Poland, de facto exchange rate regimes followed their 
de jure regimes relatively closely. The Czech and Slovak Republic take an intermediate position, 
with some evidence of exchange rate targeting to the D-Mark/ Euro even after they switched to 
floating regimes, whereas Romania is special, because it seems to have moved to an implicit 
Dollar peg. The Slovenian success in implicitly targeting its exchange rate may not be too 
surprising. Slovenia has opened its capital account relatively late, thus sheltering its exchange 
rate from external shocks. Accordingly, one should be careful in advising implicit exchange rate 
targeting, as the external environment may limit the viability of this option.   
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 Appendix 
 
TABLE A1. Official exchange rate regimes since 1994 
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovenia/Romania Slovak Republic 
Since 27.5.1997 Managed float Since 1.10.2001 Peg to EUR 
(276,1 HUF/ EUR) 
Band: ±15% 
Since 12.4.2000 Full floating Since 
1.1.1994 
Managed 
floating 
Since 
1.10.1998 
Managed 
floating 
Since 1.3.1996 Band: ± 7,5% 
D2 
Since 5/2001 Band: ±15% 
D4 
Since 1.1.1999 45% USD, 
55% EUR 
D4 
  Since 
1.1.1997 
Band: ± 7% 
D2 
Since 1.1.1994 Basket peg 
65% DEM, 
35%USD 
Band: ± 0.5% 
D1 
Since 
1.1.2000 
100% EUR 
D3 
Since 25.2.1998 Band: ± 10% 
D3 
  Since 
1.1.1994 
Basket peg 
60% DEM, 
40%USD 
Band: ± 1.5% 
D1 
  Since 1.1.1997 70% DEM, 
30% USD 
D2 
Since 16.5.1995 Band: ± 7% 
D2 
    
  Since 1.1.1994 Crawling peg* 
70% Ecu, 
30% USD 
Band: ±2.25% 
D1 
Since 1.1.1994 Crawling peg 
45% USD, 35% 
DEM, 10% GBP, 
5% FF, 5% SF 
Band: ±1 % 
D1 
    
D1 to D4: Dummies used in the regressions of section 3.3. 
Source: IMF, Exchange Rate Arrangements and Restrictions, various issues 
* Until 16.3.1995, the NBH devalued in discrete steps.
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FIGURE A1. Exchange rate development of the Czech koruna, daily data, 1.1.1994-
28.10.2002 
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FIGURE A2. Exchange rate development of the Hungarian forint, daily data, 1.1.1994-
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28.10.2002 
FIGURE A3. Exchange rate development of the Polish zloty, daily data, 16.5.1995-28.10.2002 
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FIGURE A4. Exchange rate development of the Romanian leu, daily data, 1.1.1994-
28.10.2002 
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FIGURE A5. Exchange rate development of the Slovak koruna, daily data, 1.1.1994-
28.10.2002 
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FIGURE A6. Exchange rate development of the Slovenian tolar, daily data, 1.1.1994-
28.10.2002 
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FIGURE A7. Absolute exchange rate returns, daily data, 1.1.1994-28.10.2002 
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DATA:  
 
Monthly and quarterly data: IFS (unless otherwise stated) 
Foreign exchange reserves (line 1d.d) 
Base money (line 14) 
Interest rate:  
Money market rate (line 60b),  
for Hungary: Treasury bill rate (line 60c) 
for the Slovak Republic: Average lending rate (line 60p) 
for Romania: Average refinancing rate of banks (National Bank of Romania), since 1999: 
Treasury bill rate (line 60c) 
 
Daily exchange rate data: 
Deutsche Bundesbank data base; for the Slovenian Tolar: BoS 
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